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The quantum-like description of the dynamics
of party governance in the US political system
Polina Khrennikova; Andrei Khrennikov; Emmanuel Haven 1
Abstract
This paper is devoted to the application of the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics to social (political) science. By using the quantum dynamical equations
we model the process of decision making in US elections. The crucial point we at-
tempt to make is that the voter’s mental state can be represented as a superposition
of two possible choices for either republicans or democrats. However, reality dictates
a more complicated situation: typically a voter participates in two elections, i.e. the
congress and the presidential elections. In both elections he/she has to decide be-
tween two choices. This very feature of the US election system requires that the
mental state is represented by a 2-qubit state corresponding to the superposition of
4 different choices (e.g. for republicans in the congress; for the president as a demo-
crat). The main issue of this paper is to describe the dynamics of the voters’ mental
states taking in account the mental and socio- political environment. What is truly
novel in this paper is that instead of using Schro¨dinger’s equation to describe the
dynamics in an absence of interactions, we here apply the quantum master equation.
This equation describes quantum decoherence, i.e., resolution from superposition to
a definite choice.
1 Introduction
For the last ten years, the mathematical formalism of quantum theory has been
actively applied outside the domain of quantum physics. We have seen numer-
ous applications in decision making (both in cognitive and social science),
economics and also finance. See for instance Acacio de Barros and Suppes
(2009) [1], Asano et al. (2010) [3], Bruza et al. (2005 [6], 2009a [7], 2009b [8]);
Busemeyer et al. (2006a [10], 2006b [11]); Cheon et al. (2006 [13], 2010 [14]);
Choustova (2007 [15]), Pothos et al. (2009) [35], Franco (2009) [23], Haven
(2006 [24], 2008a [25], 2008b [26], 2009 [27]) and La Mura (2008) [32].
1 PK; EH: School of Management, University of Leicester, United Kingdom; AK:
International Center for Mathematical Modelling in Physics and Cognitive Science,
Linnaeus University, Sweden
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Recently the quantum-like (QL) approach started to be explored in political
science. Some of the QL features of the behavior of voters in the US political
system were discussed in Zorn and Smith (2011) [45]. The authors start with a
comparison of the notions of state separability in conventional models of party
governance and in quantum information theory (see Zorn and Smith (2011)
[45]) and they then show that the QL model might provide a more adequate
description of the voters’ state space – ‘mental space’. The authors present
a strong motivation of the usage of the complex Hilbert space as the voters’
‘mental space.’
In this paper we present a QL-model describing the dynamics of the voters’
state (as represented in the complex Hilbert space). First, we consider what
we could call ‘a free QL-dynamics’, when a voter 2 is not under the pressure of
mass media and the social environment. By applying the quantum approach
we describe the dynamics of her state by using an analogue of the Schro¨dinger
equation. A simple mathematical analysis implies that Alice’s preferences en-
coded in her state-vector (‘mental wave function’) fluctuate without stabiliza-
tion to the definite state. Hence, such a dynamics can describe the unstable
part of the electorate: those voters who have no firm preferences. In quantum
physics, stabilization and damping of fluctuations is a typical consequence of
interaction with the environment 3 . We apply this approach to the problem of
the stabilization of fluctuations of voters’ preferences.
An essential part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the applicability
of quantum dynamics to a social system (e.g. a voter) which is coupled to the
social environment. The main problem is that the exact quantum dynamics
of a system coupled to the physical environment is extremely complicated.
Therefore, to simplify matters, typically a quantum Markov approximation is
applied. This approximation is applicable under a number of non-trivial condi-
tions (see Ingarden et al. (1997) [28]). Our aim is to translate these conditions
into the language of social science and to analyze their applicability to the
dynamics of voters’ preferences. In this connection the quantum Markovian
dynamics, especially via the quantum master equation, can model (approxi-
mately) voters’ preference dynamics. Our approach is based on the quantum
master equation which describes the interaction of a social system with a ‘so-
cial bath’. We use a very general framework which can be applied to a variety
of problems in politics, social science, economics, and finance. The main prob-
lem of any concrete application is to analyze the conditions of applicability
of the quantum master equation (the quantum Markov approximation) to the
corresponding problem in decision making.
2 Following the tradition of quantum information theory, we call such a voter ‘Alice’.
In game theory ‘Alice’ is also often used.
3 Such environment in physics is also known as ‘bath’.
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We remark that the work of Fiorina (1996) [21] played an important role in
the motivation of the quantum model based on the use of entangled quan-
tum states (see Zorn and Smith (2011) [45] for the two institutional choices
in U.S. politics – the congress and the presidency). Zorn and Smith (2011)
[45] also present a detailed analysis of the inter-relation between classical and
quantum models. Such an analysis is very important to attract the interest
of mainstream researchers in decision making to quantum models. For such
researchers, the applications of the quantum formalism to social science may
on prima facie be considered as quite exotic. Therefore, in this paper, we
begin with an extended section in which we compare classical and quantum
probabilistic approaches to decision making. Our aim is not only to stress the
differences, but also to find the commonalities. Our findings argue for an im-
portant degree of similarity between quantum and subadditive probabilistic
descriptions of decision making. We also emphasize the vital role of contextu-
ality.
2 Inter-relation between quantum and traditional models of deci-
sion making
2.1 (Non-) Bayesian approach
One of the basic tools of probabilistic investigations in psychology, cognitive
science, economics and finance is Bayesian analysis (see De Finetti (1972) [17]
and Kreps (1988) [31]) which allows for a process of mental updating of prob-
abilities (objective or subjective depending on the interpretation 4 ) on the
basis of newly collected statistical data. Bayesian probability can be distin-
guished to be objective (independent of the individual who makes a decision)
or subjective, that is to say, related to the personal belief of an individual
(see De Finetti (1974) [17]). The objective probabilities represent the choice
that rational agents should make in the light of an objective situation and
updating occurs as a consequence of the appearance of any new event (see
Chalmers (1999) [12]). By this approach the agents are supposed to distribute
the prior probabilities equally on the basis of some principle of indifference. In
particular, the Bayesian approach plays an important role in classical decision
making (see De Finetti (1972) [17]). We stress that this method is a part of
conventional (‘classical’) probability theory based on Kolmogorov’s axiomatics
(1950) [30]. The Bayes formula for conditional probabilities is:
P (A|B) = P (AB)/P (B); (1)
4 There are two ‘camps’ around the interpretations of Bayesian probabilities divided
in so called ‘objectivists’ and ‘subjectivists’. See Chalmers (1999) [12].
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where P (B) 6= 0. The law of total probability forms an integral part of the
classical Bayesian approach. Let us consider the law of total probability in the
simplest situation. Consider an event B and its complement B¯ and assume
that the probabilities of both these events are positive. Then, for any event
A, the following formula (of total probability) holds:
P (A) = P (B)P (A|B) + P (B¯)P (A|B¯). (2)
We note that for quantum probabilities, the law of total probability is violated!
In general, the difference between the left-hand and right-hand sides of (2) is
nonzero. This difference is nothing else than the influence of the interference
term, which plays a fundamental role in quantum theory (as well as in classical
physical wave theories). The quantum analog of the law of total probability
has the form:
P (A) = P (B)P (A|B) + P (B¯)P (A|B¯) + 2cos θ
√
P (B)P (A|B)P (B¯)P (A|B¯).
(3)
Depending on the sign of cos θ one observes constructive (cos θ > 0) or
destructive (cos θ < 0) interference. In the first case the probability to observe
some phenomenon increases so much that it cannot be explained by the laws of
classical probability theory. In the second case one similarly finds a ‘mystical’
decreasing of probability (e.g., probabilities P1 = P2 = 1/2 can result in a
zero probability, P12 = 0). In the case cos θ = 0 the quantum formula of total
probability (the formula containing thus an interference of probabilities) is
reduced to the classical law of total probability. This is a very important point
of transition from usage of the classical probabilistic model to the quantum
probabilistic model.
By decreasing the absolute value of interference coefficient, the latter can be
transformed into the former (as the coefficient vanishes). Thus the quantum
probabilistic models in cognitive science, psychology, and social science are
natural extensions of the classical models. If the deviation of the left-hand
side of equation (3) from the right-hand side is relatively small, we can ig-
nore the interference contribution and proceed with the classical law of total
probability.
In summary, we can think of the quantum approach of decision making as a
natural generalization of the Bayesian approach which is based on the transi-
tion from the classical formula of total probability to its quantum analogue.
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2.2 Subadditive probability in social science, psychology, behavioral economics
and finance
The following questions naturally arise when considering the use of equation
(3) as a new tool in decision making:
(1) Is the departure from equation (2) to equation (3) a totally new step in
the development of probabilistic modeling in social science?
(2) Are there other conventional social models based on departures from the
laws of classical probability?
Surprisingly for those who argue for the exceptional novelty of the quantum
approach to social problems, the answer is ‘yes’. In mainstream studies in
cognitive science, psychology, behavioral economics and finance, non-classical
probability has been actively used during many years.
Comparing the quantum approach with the traditional non-classical proba-
bilistic approaches is not a straightforward task. In QL models the violation of
the law of total probability is considered as the crucial point. However, the ma-
jority of traditional non-classical models are not based on the aforementioned
violation of equation(2), but rather on an application of subadditive probabil-
ities. Hence, the violation of the law of additive probability has already been
actively discussed in social science. Khrennikov and Haven (2007) [29] indicate
(p. 23) that “when experiment participants have to express their degree of be-
liefs on a [0, 1] interval, probabilistic additivity will be violated in many cases
and subadditivity obtains. See Bearden et al. (2005) [4] for a good overview.”
Khrennikov and Haven (2007) [29] continue as follows (p. 23-24): “Bearden
et al. (2005) [4] also indicate that such subadditivity has been obtained with
experiment participants belonging to various industry groups, such as option
traders for instance (Fox et al. (1996) [22]). The key work pertaining to the
issue of subadditivity in psychology is by Tversky and Koehler (1994) [41]
and Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997) [36]. Their theory, also known under
the name of ‘Support Theory’ is in the words of Tversky and Koehler (1994)
[41] ‘...a theory in which the judged probability of an event depends on the
explicitness of its description.’ In other words, it is not the event which is
important as such but its description. In Tversky and Koehler (1994) [41] the
authors highlight the ‘current state of affairs’...on the various interpretations
that subjective probability may have. Amongst the interpretations is Zadeh’s
(1978) [44] possibility theory and the upper and lower probability approach
of Suppes (1974) [38]. The paper of Dubois and Prade (1998) [18], also men-
tioned in Tversky and Koehler (1994) [41], provides for an excellent overview
on non-additive probability approaches.”
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To couple QL models based on the violation of the law of total probability and
Bayesian probability, with traditional studies based on subadditive probabili-
ties, we need to recall that the mathematical derivation of the formula of total
probability is based on the additivity of probability and the Bayes formula
for conditional probabilities. Therefore there are two possible sources of vio-
lation of equation (2): i) subadditivity and ii) the non-Bayesian definition of
conditional probability. Both these sources exhibit themselves in QL-models.
Hence, the subadditivity of probability is an important common point of the
QL and traditional (based on non-classical probability) approaches. Moreover,
many experts in quantum physics especially stress the role of subadditivity of
quantum probability as the main source of quantum interference (Feynman
and Hibbs (1965) [20].
The QL approach can be considered as a special mathematical model describ-
ing the usage of subadditive probability in social science. It is not clear whether
any social science based model with subadditive probability can be embedded
in the QL-approach. The quantum probabilities have a very special structure:
they are based on complex probability amplitudes, vectors from a complex
linear space and probability is obtained from a squared complex amplitude. It
is not clear whether any subadditive probability from the aforementioned social
science based models can be represented in this way. Nevertheless, even if it
might imply the loss of generality, the use of the linear space representation
simplifies the operation with probabilities. Furthermore, it provides us with a
possibility to use a powerful mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics
in an interdisciplinary way.
In this paper, we intend to explore quantum dynamical equations. We stress
that the form of these equations depend very much on whether interaction
with the environment is taken into account or neglected. Here we are merely
interested in the application of quantum dynamics to the modeling of the
evolution of the mental state of a human being interacting with an extremely
complex social environment. The complexity of the actual environment is so
high that it strongly influences the decision making process of an individual,
finally implying a resolution from superposition of his/her mental states. In
quantum terms a decoherence takes place.
2.3 Savage sure thing principle and disjunction effect
Bayesian probability according to Maher (2010) [33] (p. 120) “explicates a
kind of rationality we would like our choices to have...” Correspondingly, the
‘absolute rational choice’ Maher (2010) (p.120) refers to, can be understood as
“the maximization of expected utility.” The Bayesian updating of probabilities
and the validity of the law of total probability have a direct coupling with the
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problem of rationality in decision making. von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
(1944) [42] expected utility theory, and Savage’s sure thing principle (Savage
(1954) [37]) postulate a complete rationality (i.e. a maximization of one’s
own payoff and the minimizing of one’s own losses). Savage (1954) [37] (p.
21) proposed the so called ‘Sure thing principle (STP)’, denoting that: “If a
person would not prefer [a decision] f to g, either knowing that the event B
obtained, or knowing that the event B¯ obtained, then he does not prefer f
to g [whether knowing or not if the event B or B¯ happened].” Savage (1954)
[37] illustrates the validity of the principle with an example of a businessman,
who considers whether to buy some property before the presidential elections
or not. Savage (1954) (p. 21) describes the situation of a businessman who is
uncertain if the Republicans or Democrats will win the election campaign. He
decides that he would buy the property if the Republicans win, but also he
decides that he should buy the property even if the Democrats win. By taking
the decision to buy in any case (for example the decision g), it is natural to
assume that the businessman will buy the property being uncertain of whether
the Republicans (event B) or Democrats will win (event B¯). The principle
could be statistically represented with help of the formula of total probability
(equation (2)), where the events B and B¯ are assigned some probability and
the decision A (here depicted as g, to be consistent with Savage’s symbols)
would be a conditional probability of B and B¯, so that the exact statistical
probability for the possible decision g could be obtained. In this illustration
we see that the conditional probability of g would be equal to one (i.e. there is
100% confidence about the purchase of a house). According to Croson (1999)
[16] the event B can be as well i) an exogenous risk: the uncertainty about the
state of nature (e.g. the property purchase) as well as ii) a strategic risk: an
uncertainty about the choice of a strategic opponent (e.g. a competitor starts
a price war). Croson (1999) [16] describes such a pattern of decision making
as ‘consequential reasoning’, as the individual considers the consequences (for
instance the amount of the payoffs) before considering a particular action.
Savage’s Sure thing Principle has been regarded as a foundation axiom for de-
cision making in economics. Kreps (1998) [31] (p. 120) called Savage’s principle
the “crowning glory of choice theories”. However, many experiments, such as
Allais (1953) [2], Tversky and Shafir (1992) [40], Croson (1999) [16] proved
that economic decision makers in general tend to violate the Savage sure thing
principle and expected utility theory. For example, in a Prisoner Dilemma type
game experiment, violation of the rationality postulate of Savage’s sure thing
principle was found in experiments performed by Tversky and Shafir (1992)
[40] and later repeated by Croson (1999) [16] and Busemeyer et al. (2006) [10].
Traditionally, this game is played in three conditions. In the ‘unknown’ con-
dition the player acts without knowing the opponent’s action. In the known
‘defect condition’, the player knows that the opponent has defected before
he/she acted. In the known ‘cooperate condition’ the player knows that the
opponent has cooperated, before he/she acted. See also Tversky and Shafir
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(1992) [40] and Pothos and Busemeyer (2009) [35].
We cite Tversky and Shafir (1992) [40] (p. 309) “The subjects... played a se-
ries of prisoners dilemma games, without feedback, each against a different
unknown opponent supposedly selected at random from among the partici-
pants. In this setup the rate of cooperation was 3% when subjects knew that
the subject knew that the opponent has defected and 16% when they knew
that the opponent has cooperated. However, when the subjects did not know
whether their opponent had cooperated or defected (as is normally the case
of the game) [condition of uncertainty]) the rate of cooperation rose to 37%.”
This experiment showed that when the players are unaware of their oppo-
nents actions, they do not behave rationally as they are supposed to do in
a conventional prisoners dilemma game. This anomaly in behavior occurred
in other games of the Prisoners Dilemma type and also in Hawaiian vacation
experiments. The basic effect those experiments have in common is referred to
by Tversky and Shafir (1992) [40] and Croson (1999) [16] as the ‘disjunction
effect’. Busemeyer et al. (2006) [?] show that the disjunction effect is equiva-
lent to the violation of the law of total probability. Since this law is violated
by QL models, all such models in social science exhibit the disjunction affect.
2.4 Contextuality
In the quantum community there is still no consensus on the basic roots of
‘quantum mysteries’; in particular, the grounds for the violation of the laws of
classical probability theory. One hundred years after the creation of quantum
mechanics (the 1920’s-1930’s starting with the founders of quantum mechanics
: Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein), the intensity of debates about its foundation
have not abated. We may even claim the debates are more intense. One of the
possible sources of the quantum mysteries is the notion of contextuality. The
viewpoint that the results of quantum observations depend crucially on the
measurement context was proposed by Niels Bohr, who emphasized that we
are not able to approach the micro world (with the aid of our measurement
devices) without bringing essential disturbances into its state. The quantum
systems are too sensitive to the measurement apparata. The context of mea-
surement plays an essential (depending on the interpretation, even crucial)
role in forming the result of our measurement. According to the fundamental
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’, quan-
tum systems do not have objective properties which exist independently of
‘questions’ asked to these systems in the context of measurement. Says Sup-
pes (1974) [38] (p. 171-172): “Any time we measure a microscopic object by
using macroscopic apparatus we disturb the state of the microscopic object
and, according to the fundamental ideas of quantum mechanics, we cannot
hope to improve the situation by using new methods of measurement that
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will lead to exact results of the classical sort for simultaneously measured
conjugate variables.”
The contextual viewpoint is attributed to the origin of non-classical probabilis-
tic behavior of quantum systems and is very attractive for those who already
apply or aim to apply a quantum formalism in other domains outside physics.
It is important to stress that the contextual interpretation of quantum me-
chanics is more ‘innocent’ than other essentially more exotic viewpoints, such
as the quantum non- locality concept or the ‘many worlds’ interpretations.
The majority of people working in cognitive science and psychology would
not accept a possibility of non-local interactions between human beings, e.g.
through a splitting of reality in many worlds.
The concept of contextuality is a well known feature of cognitive systems.
We also see the origin of non-Bayesian (‘irrational’ 5 ) decision making in the
contextuality of observations performed for mental quantities, including self-
observations. Hence, the value of the subjective probability does not exist
independently of the measurement context, only whilst ‘asking about some-
one’s preferences’ including ourselves, we create them.
For example, in semantics studies context is treated by representing it as cue
words, or co- appearing words. This semantic contextuality (well known and
actively explored in traditional semantic models) was used as the starting
point for the development of QL models of word recognition (see Bruza et
al. (2005 [6], 2009a [7], 2009b [8]). We also remark that contextual models of
reasoning play an important role in artificial intelligence (see f.i. Giunchiglia
(1993) [19], McCarthy (1993) [34].
We now come back to the problem of rationality in decision making. We remark
that contextuality of reasoning is closely coupled with the so called ‘framing
effect’. Kreps (1988) [31] remarks (p. 197) that “the way in which a decision
problem is framed or posed can affect the choices made by decision makers.”
According to Tversky and Kahnemann (1981) [39] the term ‘decision frame’
refers (p. 453) “to the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes and
contingencies associated with a particular choice.” One of the most important
contributions of the QL approach to the problem of contextual reasoning is
the recognition of the existence of incompatible contexts and the use of well
developed quantum tools for testing incompatibility, such as Heisenberg’s un-
certainty relation or the violation of Bell’s inequality (see f.i. Khrennikov and
Haven (2007) [29]). In particular, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game the con-
texts Cknown (the decision of the partner is known), and Cunknown (information
is absent), are incompatible. Consequently, the QL approach is about:
(1) the violation of the Sure Thing Principle,
5 For a comparison, please see section 2.3. (especially Maher (2010) [33])
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(2) ‘irrational’ decision making,
(3) non-Bayesian decision making, and
(4) the usage of subadditive probability.
All these problems have already been widely discussed in traditional ap-
proaches to cognitive science, psychology, behavioral economics and finance.
The QL approach is just one of the mathematical models which accurately
describes all of the above effects.
Finally, we point to one of the pioneer papers that assigned quantum-like
contextuality to the measurement of belief in decision making theories. Suppes
(1974) [38] conjectured that general concepts taken from quantum mechanics
could provide for the measurement of belief. He also explained the importance
of the particular measurement context, by asserting that (p. 172): ‘it is a
mistake to think of beliefs as being stored in some fixed and inert form in
the memory of a person. When a question is asked about personal beliefs, one
constructs a belief coded in a belief statement as a response to the question.
As the kind of question varies, the construction varies, and the results vary.”
We could articulate that the notion of measurement context, borrowed from
quantum mechanics can be regarded as one of the promising theories of mea-
surement of belief.
3 Description of election campaign by the theory of open quantum
systems
With the help of the above mentioned features of QL models we now attempt
to describe the dynamics of the process of decision making within the problem
setting of party governance in the US-type two party system. This system
allows voters to cast partisan ballots in two contests: executive and legislative.
By so doing they can thus choose for instance ‘Republican’ in one institutional
choice setting and ‘Democratic’ in the other (see Zorn and Smith (2011) [45]).
It is well known from physics that the quantum state dynamics are described
by Schro¨dinger’s equation. This type of dynamics is unitary. Roughly speaking
it is combined of a family of rotations and in principle, this family can be
infinite. Pothos and Busemeyer (2009) [35] applied this equation to model the
dynamics of the process of decision making in games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
type. However, it is questionable whether we can describe the dynamics of
voters’ expectation by the Schro¨dinger’s equation. This equation describes the
dynamics of an isolated system, i.e., a system which does not interact with the
environment. A voter in the context of the election campaign definitely cannot
be considered as an isolated social system. She, say Alice, is in permanent
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contact with mass media (whether TV or internet). Such an influence of the
environment induces random fluctuations of opinions and choices in Alice’s
mind.
For the purposes of our research, we are interested in the ‘unstable’ part of
the electorate which is composed of citizens who have no concrete opinions
and who will make their electoral choice very close to the actual day of the
elections (see Zaller and Feldman (1992) [43]).
If Alice could be considered as an isolated social system, then the only possibil-
ity to describe a transition from the mental state of superposition of choices
to the state corresponding to the concrete choice was to use the projection
postulate of quantum mechanics (the so called ‘von Neumann postulate’).
This state reduction process, from superposition to one of its components, is
called the state collapse 6 . Such collapse is imagined as an instantaneous (the
jump-type) transition from one state to another. The state collapse might be
used to describe the situation in which Alice makes her choice precisely at
the moment of completing the voting bulletin. This type of behavior cannot
be completely excluded from consideration, but such a case is probably not
statistically significant. Moreover, mainstream quantum mechanical thought
will tell us that the state collapse occurs when an isolated system driven by
Schro¨dinger’s equation interacts practically instantaneously with a measure-
ment device. Thus when Alice is totally isolated from the election campaign,
she is suddenly asked to make her choice. It is evident that the process of
decision making for the majority of the ‘unstable population’ in the electorate
differs in essential ways from this collapse-type behavior.
Therefore, let us take more seriously the role which the social environment
plays in the process of decision making. We apply to social science the theory
of open quantum systems, i.e., systems which interact with a large thermo-
stat (‘bath’). Since a bath is a huge physical system with millions of variables
(the complexity of the “social bath” around an American citizen who will
cast his/her vote in the election campaign is huge), it is in general impos-
sible to provide a reasonable mathematical description of the dynamics of a
quantum system interacting with such a bath. Physicists proceed under a few
assumptions which allow then for the possibility to describe those dynamics
in an approximate way. In quantum physics the interaction of a quantum sys-
tem with a bath is described by a quantum version of the master equation
for Markovian dynamics. The quantum Markovian dynamics are given by the
Gorini-Kossakowski-Sudarshan-Lindblad (GKSL) equation. See e.g. Ingarden
et al. (1997) [28] for details. This GSKL equation is the most popular approx-
imation of quantum dynamics in the presence of interaction with a bath.
6 The state collapse is considered as one of the main mysteries of quantum physics.
This notion is still a subject of intensive debate.
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We briefly remind the origins of the GKSL-dynamics. The starting point is
that the state of a composite system, a quantum system s combined with
a bath, is a pure quantum state, complex vector Ψ. The evolution of Ψ is
described by Schro¨dinger’s equation. This is an evolution in a Hilbert space of
a huge dimension, since a bath has so many degrees of freedom. The existence
of the Schro¨dinger dynamics in the huge Hilbert space has a merely theoretical
value. Observers are interested in the dynamics of the state φs of the quantum
system s. The next fundamental assumption in the derivation of the GKSL-
equation is the Markovian character of the evolution, i.e. the absence of long
term memory effects. It is assumed that interaction with the bath destroys
such effects. Thus, the GKSL-evolution is a Markovian evolution. Finally, we
point to the condition of the ‘factorizability’ of the initial state of a composite
system (a quantum system coupled with a bath), Ψ = φs⊗φbath, where ⊗ is the
sign of the tensor product. Physically factorization is equivalent to the absence
of correlations 7 . One of the distinguishing features of the evolution under the
mentioned assumptions is the existence of one or few equilibrium points. The
state of the quantum system s stabilizes to one of such points in the process of
evolution: a pure initial state, a complex vector ψs, is transformed into a mixed
state, a density matrix ρs(t) (classical state without superposition effects).
In contrast to the GKSL-evolution, the Schro¨dinger evolution does not induce
stabilization. Any solution different from an eigenvector of the Hamiltonian
will oscillate for ever. Another property of the Schro¨dinger dynamics is that
it always transfers a pure state into a pure state, i.e., a vector into a vector:
quantumness if it was originally present in a state (in the form of superposi-
tion) cannot disappear in the process of a continuous dynamical evolution. The
transition from quantum indeterminism to classical determinism can happen
only as the result of the collapse of the quantum state.
On the one hand, in our model of the decision making for party governance
we would like to avoid the usage of the state collapse. On the other hand,
to make a decision, Alice has to make a transition from a quantum to a
classical representation of her preferences. We note that in quantum physics all
experimentally obtained information is classical as well. The GKSL-evolution
provides for such a possibility (and without ‘quantum jumps’). Alice’s mental
state evolves in a smooth way (fluctuations exist but they are damped) to the
final classical decision state.
7 At the beginning of evolution; later they are induced by the interaction term of
Hamiltonian – the generator of evolution.
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4 Matching of assumptions of applicability of the quantum master
equation with conditions of the modern election campaign
We now list the social conditions corresponding to the above mentioned physi-
cal conditions. This will allow us for a possibility to apply the GKSL-equation:
• (COMPL) complexity: the social environment (election bath) influencing
a voter has huge complexity
• (FREE) freedom: the mental state of a society under consideration is a
pure QL state, i.e., a superposition of various opinions and expectations;
• (DEM) democracy : the feedback reaction of a voter to the election bath is
negligibly small, it cannot essentially change the mental state of the bath;
• (SEP) separability : before the start of the election campaign a voter was
independent of the election bath;
• (MARK) Markovness : a voter does not use a long range memory on inter-
action with the election bath to update her state.
We surely need to make some comments on those assumptions.
(1) The assumption (COMPL), complexity, is definitely justified. Nowadays
an election campaign has huge information complexity: the richness of
media sources accounts for such complexity. We can even speculate that
the proposed QL model is more adequate than say 50 years ago: the
phenomenal increase of information complexity makes the usage of the
(quantum, quantum-like) open systems approach more reasonable.
(2) The (FREE), freedom, can be interpreted as guaranteeing the freedom of
political opinions. The opposite to the (FREE)-society, is a totalitarian
society where its mental state is a classical state in which all superposi-
tions have been resolved (collapsed).
(3) The (DEM), democracy, encodes the democratic system: one voter can-
not change the mental state of society in a crucial way.
(4) The (SEP), separability, describes a sample of voters who are not that
interested in politics: they will determine their positions through an in-
teraction with the election bath during the election campaign. This part
of the electorate is the most interesting from the point of view of political
technologies.
(5) The (MARK)-assumption, Markovness, also reflects the fact that voters
under study are not that interested in politics. They do not spend a lot
of time analyzing the dynamics of the election campaign. However, they
are not isolated from the election bath; they watch TV, read newspapers
and use the internet. From a pragmatic point of view, they unconsciously
update their mental states each day by taking into account recent news.
Remark 1 (Markovness) We remark that the Markovness of the dynamics
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may induce the impression that voter’s preferences would fluctuate forever.
However, this is not the case. The mathematical formalism of quantum me-
chanics implies that quantum Markovean fluctuations stabilize to steady solu-
tions. In physics, this theoretical prediction was confirmed by numerous exper-
iments. Although the social counterparts of physical assumptions seem to be
natural and this motivates the applicability of our theoretical model, the final
justification can come only from the testing of our hypothesis by experimental
data. This is a very complex problem.
Remark 2 (Decoherence) In quantum physics the process of transforma-
tion of a pure (superposition-type) state into a classical state (given by a di-
agonal density matrix) is called decoherence. A proper interpretation of this
process is still one of the hardest problems in the foundations of quantum me-
chanics. Some authors present the viewpoint that superposition is in some way
conserved: the disappearance of superposition in a subsystem increases it in the
total system. In our model this would mean that the determination of states
of voters in the process of interaction with the election bath will transfer polit-
ical uncertainty into an increase of political uncertainty in society in general,
after elections. At the moment it is not clear whether this interpretation is
meaningful in social sciences.
5 Schro¨dinger’s dynamics
The state space of a voter (Alice) can be represented as the tensor prod-
uct of two Hilbert spaces (each of them is two dimensional). One Hilbert
space describes the election to the congress, and we denote it by the sym-
bol Hcongress, and another describes the presidential election, denote it by the
symbol Hpresident. In each of them we can select the basis corresponding to the
definite strategies e1 = |d〉, e2 = |r〉. If Alice was thinking only about the elec-
tion to congress, her mental state would be represented as the superposition
of these two basis vectors:
ψcongress = αc|d〉+ βc|r〉; (4)
where αc, βc are complex numbers and they are normalized by the condition:
|αc|2 + |βc|2 = 1. By knowing the representation of equation (4) one can find
the probabilities of intentions to vote for democrats and republicans in the
election to the congress:
pcongress(d) = |αc|2, pcongress(r) = |βc|2. (5)
However, the quantum dynamics of the state, ψcongress(t), in the absence of
interactions with the political bath (environment), see equation (12) below –
‘social Schro¨dinger equation’, is such that the probabilities pcongress(d; t),
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pcongress(r; t) fluctuate. Therefore, even if Alice wanted to vote for republicans
at t = t0, in the process of mental evolution she will change her mind many
times.
In the same way, if Alice was thinking only about the election of the president,
her mental state would be represented as a superposition of the two basis
vectors
ψpresident = αp|d〉+ βp|r〉; (6)
where |αp|2 + |βp|2 = 1. The corresponding probabilities are given by
ppresident(d) = |αp|2, ppresident(r) = |βp|2. (7)
For a moment, let us forget about the quantum model and turn to clas-
sical probability theory. Suppose that the classical probabilities pcongress(d),
pcongress(r), ppresident(d), ppresident(r) are given. Furthermore, suppose that vot-
ers do not have any kind of correlations between two elections: their choice in
the election to the congress does not depend on their choice of the president
and vice versa 8 . In this case independence implies factorization of the joint
probability distribution:
pcongress,president(dd) = pcongress(d)ppresident(d), ... (8)
However, in the case of non-trivial correlations between the congress- and
president-elections, the factorization condition is violated. In the quantum
formalism, the models described by the two Hilbert spaces are unified in the
model described by the tensor product of these two spaces. In our case we use
the space H = Hcongress ⊗Hpresident. Its elements are of the form:
ψ = ψcongress ⊗ ψpresident (9)
which describe the states corresponding to uncorrelated choices in two elec-
tions. In quantum information such states are called separable. In general a
state ψ ∈ H cannot be factorized. Nonseparable states describe correlations
between choices in the two elections:
ψ = cdd|dd〉+ cdp|dp〉+ cpd|pd〉+ cpp|pp〉; (10)
where |cdd|2+|cdp|2+|cpd|2+|cpp|2 = 1 and |dd〉 = |d〉⊗|d〉, .... The main point of
usage of the quantum formalism is that quantum correlations are not reduced
to classical correlations (as described in the framework of the Kolmogorov
model). Roughly speaking the quantum correlations can be stronger than the
classical correlations. This is the essence of Bell’s theorem, Bell (1987) [5].
We also state again that the question of inter-relation between quantum and
classical separability in the election framework was studied in Zorn and Smith
8 To escape the problem of time fluctuations of probabilities, we may assume that
both elections are done at the same time.
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(2011) [45]. However, the authors did not appeal directly to Bell’s theorem,
but to the more delicate condition of quantum (non-) separability. Its role in
social science was emphasized by Bruza et al. (2010) [9].
The quantum dynamical equation has the form:
ih
∂ψ
∂t
(t) = Hψ(t); (11)
where H is the operator of energy, the Hamiltonian, and h is the Planck
constant. The mental interpretation of an analog of the Planck constant h is a
complicated problem. We shall interpret it as the time scale parameter 9 . Since
the usage of the symbol h may be a source of misunderstanding (especially
for physical science educated readers), we shall use a new scaling parameter,
say τ having the dimension of time (please see the preceding footnote). It
determines the time scale of updating of the mental state of Alice during the
election campaign. We rewrite the dynamical equation as:
iτ
∂ψ
∂t
(t) = Hψ(t). (12)
And we call the operator H , the decision Hamiltonian.
The most general HamiltonianH in the space of mental states in the two-party
systems (wherein voters can cast partisan ballots in two contests, executive
and legislative) has the form
H = Hstab +Hflip, (13)
where Hstab is the part of the Hamiltonian responsible for the stability of the
distribution of opinions about various possible selections of decisions. It is
given by
Hstab = λdd,dd|dd〉〈dd|+ λrr,rr|rr〉〈rr|+ λdr,dr|dr〉〈dr|+ λrd,rd|rd〉〈rd|. (14)
And Hflip is the part of Hamiltonian responsible for flipping from one selection
of the pair of strategies (for executive and legislative branches) to another. It
is given by
Hflip = λdd,rr|dd〉〈rr|+ λrr,dd|rr〉〈dd|+ λrd,dr|rd〉〈dr|+ λrd,dr|rd〉〈dr|. (15)
To induce a unitary evolution, the Hamiltonian has to be Hermitian. This
9 In quantum physics the Planck constant has the dimension of action:
time× energy. In this paper we do not want to speculate on such a controver-
sial topic as “mental energy” (but see however, Choustova (2007) [15]). Therefore,
we proceed formally by considering the evolution generator H as a dimensionless
quantity.
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induces the following restrictions to its coefficients: λdd,dd, ..., λrd,rd are real
and λdd,rr = λrr,dd, ..., λrd,dr = λdr,rd.
In the absence of the Hflip-component, the probabilistic structure of superpo-
sition is preserved. Only phases of choices evolve in the rotation-like way, e.g.,
|dd〉 evolves as
ψdd(t) = e
−
it
τ
λdd,dd|dd〉
which corresponds to a “rotation” of the strategy dd for the “angle” ∆θ =
tλdd,dd. A larger λ induces quicker rotation. The meaning of such rotations of
mental states has to be clarified in the process of the model’s development. We
can speculate that the coefficient λdd,dd correspond to the speed of self-analysis
(by Alice) of the choice dd.
In the presence of the flipping component Hflip the distribution of probabilities
of choices of various strategies changes in the process of evolution. Such flip-
ping from one strategy to another makes the state dynamics really quantum.
In fact, for political technologies per se´, the most important component is the
flipping part of the Hamiltonian. Of course, at the moment we proceed at a
very abstract theoretical level. However, one may hope to develop the present
QL model to the level of real applications.
Example 3 Suppose that Alice has neither a firm association with democrats
nor with republicans, i.e., the diagonal elements of the decision Hamiltonian
are equal to zero. Suppose also that the flipping part of the Hamiltonian con-
tains only the transition:
|dr〉 → |rd〉, (16)
which expresses the combination (democrats, republicans) into the combina-
tion (republicans, democrats), and vice versa. Let λdr,rd = λrd,dr = λ > 0.
The Schro¨dinger equation has the form of a system of linear ordinary differ-
ential equations. The dynamics of coincidence of choices is trivial: iτ dxdd(t)
dt
=
0, iτ dxrr(t)
dt
= 0. Hence, xdd(t) = xdd(0), xrr(t) = xrr(0). However, the pres-
ence of a nontrivial transition channel, equation (16), induces fluctuations of
Alice’s preferences for choices dr and rd. Here we have the system of two
equations:
iτ
dxdr(t)
dt
= λxrd(t), iτ
dxrd(t)
dt
= λxdr(t). (17)
Its solutions have the form:
xdr(t) = xdr(0) cos
λt
τ
− ixrd(0) sin λt
τ
, (18)
xrd(t) = −ixdr(0) sin λt
τ
+ xrd(0) cos
λt
τ
. (19)
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6 Dynamics in the election bath
In physics the dynamics of a system in a bath is described by the quantum
analog of the master equation, the GKSL-equation, see section 3. We write this
equation by using the time scaling constant τ, instead of the Planck constant:
iτ
∂ρ
∂t
(t) = [H, ρ(t)] + L(ρ(t)); (20)
where L is a linear operator acting in the space of operators on the complex
Hilbert space. In the dynamics described by equation (20), density operators
are transformed into density operators. The general form of L was found by
Gorini, Kossakowski, Sudarshan, and Lindblad (see, for example, Ingarden et
al. (1997) [28]. For now, we are not interested in (the rather complex) structure
of L. For our applications, it is sufficient to know that it can be expressed
through matrix multiplication for a family of matrices. The simplest dynamics
of interaction of Alice with the two party election campaign is determined
by two matrices Vd and Vr corresponding to advertising of democrats and
republicans, respectively. Under natural selection of the matrices H, Vd, Vr any
solution of this equation stabilizes to a diagonal density matrix
ρdecision = diag(pdd, pdr, prd, prr). (21)
This matrix describes the distribution of firmly established decisions for voting
strategies xy, where x, y = d, r.
The density matrix ρdecision describes a population of voters who finally de-
termine their choices. Denote the number of people in this population by
N. There are then (approximately) ndd = pddN people in the mental state
|dd〉,...and nrr = prrN people in the mental state |rr〉. For example, people in
the mental state |dd〉 have firmly selected to vote for democrats both in the
executive and legislative branches. Their decision is stable. From a pragmatic
point of view there is no possibility to manipulate opinions of people in this
population.
6.1 Comparing mental states given by vectors and density matrices
Consider two populations, say E1 and E2. Suppose that in our QL model the
first one is described by a pure state
ψ = cdd|dd〉+ cdr|dr〉+ crd|rd〉+ crr|dd〉; (22)
and the second one by the density matrix given by equation (21). Moreover,
suppose that the complex amplitudes given by the coefficients in the expansion
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(equation (22)) produce the same probabilities as the density matrix, i.e.:
pxy = |cxy|2. (23)
One may ask: “What is the difference?” At first sight there is no difference at
all, since we obtain the same probability distribution of preferences. However,
the distributions of mental state in ensembles E1 and E2 are totally different.
All people in E1 are in the same state of indeterminacy (superposition) ψ.
They are in doubt. They are ready to change their opinion (to create a new
superposition of opinions). The E1 is a proper population for political manipu-
lations. To the opposite of population E1, the population E2 consists of people
who have already resolved their doubts. Their mental states have already been
reduced to states of the form xy, i.e. definite choices 10 .
6.2 Independence from the initial state
The general theory of quantum master equations implies that for some impor-
tant open system dynamics, the limiting probability distribution does not de-
pend on the initial state! This mathematical fact has important consequences
for our QL model of elections. It tells us that in principle it is possible to create
such a quantum open system dynamics (voters interacting with some election
bath) such that the desired state ρdecision would be obtained independently of
the initial mental state of Alice. This theoretical result may play an important
role in QL election technologies. Even if a quantum master equation does not
have the unique limiting state, there are typically just a few of them. In this
case, we can split the set of all pure states (the unit sphere in the complex
Hilbert state space) into clusters of voters. For each cluster, we can predict
the final distribution of decisions.
We shall illustrate the above discussion by numerical simulation 11 of the dy-
namics of preferences of voters interacting with the “election environment”.
Example 4 We consider only the two dimensional submodel of the general
four dimensional model corresponding to a part of the electorate which have
“double preferences” – democrats in one of the elections and republicans in
another election. So, we reduce the modeling to the subspace with the basis
|dr〉, |rd〉. It is assumed that at the beginning (i.e., before interaction with the
‘election environment’) voters are in a superposition of the basic states:
|ψ〉 = c1|dr〉+ c2|rd〉, |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1. (24)
10 Please see the discussion under equation (21).
11 Using Mathematica software.
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We also assume that in the absence of interaction with the ‘election campaign’
the state of preferences fluctuations are driven by the Schro¨dinger dynamics
considered in Example 1. In the matrix form the corresponding Hamiltonian
can be written as
H =


0 λ
λ 0

 ; (25)
where λ > 0 is the parameter describing the intensity of flipping from dr to
rd and vice versa. The simplest perturbation of this Schro¨dinger equation is
given by the Lindblad term of the form given by Ingarden et al. (1997) [28]:
CρC∗ − (C∗Cρ+ ρC∗C)/2 = CρC∗ − 1
2
{C∗C, ρ};
where C∗ denotes the operator which is the Hermitian adjoint to the operator
C. As always in quantum formalism,
{U, V } = UV + V U,
which denotes the anticommutator of two operatorsU, V.We select the operator
C by using its matrix in the basis |dr〉, |rd〉 :
C =


0 λ
0 0

 ;
hence,
C∗ =


0 0
λ 0

 ;
where the parameter λ is responsible for interaction between the voter’s state.
For simplicity, the ‘election campaign’ is selected in the same way as in the
Hamiltonian (25). Thus, we proceed with the quantum master equation:
dρ
dt
(t) = −i[H, ρ(t)] + Cρ(t)C∗ − 1
2
{C∗C, ρ(t)}. (26)
We present the dynamics corresponding to symmetric superposition,
c1 = c2 =
1√
2
. (27)
See Fig. 1. Strongly asymmetric superposition
c1 =
√
0, 9, c2 =
√
0.1. (28)
See Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. Stabilization of the matrix elements of the density operator; the initial state
is symmetric superposition of state |dr〉 and |rd〉.
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Fig. 2. Stabilization of the matrix elements of the density operator; the initial state
is stronly asymmetric superposition of states |dr〉 and |rd〉.
The interaction with the ‘election environment’ plays a crucial role. Strong
oscillations of the dynamics, given by equations (18), (19) in the absence of
interaction with the ‘election bath’ are quickly damped and the matrix ele-
ments ρ11 ≡ ρdr,dr, ρ22 ≡ ρrd,rd, ρ12 ≡ ρdr,rd, and ρ¯12 = ρ21 ≡ ρrd,dr stabilize to
the definite values. Thus the preferences of population of voters who were in
fluctuating superposition of choices stabilize under the pressure of the ‘elec-
tion bath’. We selected such a form of interaction between a voter and the
‘election bath’ such that both initial states, the totally symmetric state, i.e.,
no preference to dr nor rd, and the state with very strong preference for the dr
combination in votes to congress and of president, p(dr) = 0.9, p(rd) = 0.1, in-
duce dynamics with stabilization to the same density matrix ρlim. This example
demonstrates the power of the social environment which, in fact, determines
the choices of voters.
In the ρlim the elements ρdr,dr ≈ 0.6, ρrd,rd ≈ 0.4 determine corresponding
probabilities p(dr) ≈ 0.6, p(rd) = 0, 4. Under the pressure of the social en-
vironment those who started with a superposition as indicated in equation
(27) increase the dr-preference and those who started with the superposition
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Fig. 3. Stabilization of linear entropy: the initial state is symmetric superposition
of states |dr〉 and |rd〉.
in equation (28) decrease this preference, and the resulting distribution of
choices is the same in both populations (with the initial state (27) and with
the initial state (28)).
We stress that manipulation by the preferences described by the dynamics in
equation (26) in sufficiently smooth. Those dynamics are an extension of the
‘free thinking’ dynamics given by the Schro¨dinger equation, the first term in
the right-hand side of equation (26). Hence, in this model the social environ-
ment does not prohibit internal fluctuations of individuals, but instead damps
them to obtain a ‘peaceful’ stabilization.
We emphasize that the degree of quantum uncertainty decreases in the process
of evolution. One of the standard measures of uncertainty which is used in
quantum information theory is given by so called linear entropy (see Ingarden
et al. (1997) [28]) defined as:
SL = 1− Trρ2.
For a pure state (which has the highest degree of uncertainty), the linear
entropy SL,min = 0. It increases with degeneration of purity in a quantum state
and it approaches it maximal value SL,max = 0, 5 for a maximally mixed state.
Here we consider the two dimensional case; in the general case SL,max = 1−1/d,
where d is the dimension of the state space. The dynamics of linear entropy
corresponding to the initial states as per equations (27) and (28), respectively,
are presented in Fig. 3 and Fig 4.
We see that the entropy behaves in different ways, but finally it stabilizes to
the same value SL ≈ 0.4. This value corresponds to a very large decreasing of
purity – uncertainty of the superposition type.
Numerical simulation demonstrated that, for other choices of pure initial
states, the density matrix and the linear entropy stabilize to the same val-
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Fig. 4. Stabilization of of linear entropy: the initial state is strongly asymmetric
superposition of states |dr〉 and |rd〉.
ues. Our conjecture is that it may be possible to prove theoretically that this
is really the case. However, at the moment we have only results of numerical
simulation supporting this conjecture.
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